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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This petition for rehearing seeks to persuade the Court to 
delete a single sentence of dictum from its opinion in this case. 
The dictum is not necessary to the Court's conclusion, rests on no 
cited authority or judicial reasoning, and substantially prejudices 
Plaintiffs' claim in the Utah Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation 
("ILGC") liquidation proceeding now pending in Utah Third District 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DICTUM THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT DEPOSIT INSURERS 
IS UNNECESSARY, UNSUPPORTED, AND PREJUDICIAL 
The Court's opinion in this case includes the following 
paragraph: 
Second, even if it was made directly against the State, 
plaintiff's do not have a valid statutory entitlement 
claim. Section 7-8a-8 guarantees depositors' accounts, 
not the reimbursement of thrift institution owners. In 
their brief to this court, plaintiffs claim they may 
recover under section 7-2-15(1)(d), which provides, "Any 
federal deposit insurance agency or other deposit insurer 
is subrogated to all rights of the depositors to the 
extent of all payments made for the benefit of the 
depositors . . . ." Plaintiffs were not a federal 
deposit insurance agency or other deposit insurer, 
however, and cannot rely on section 7-2-15(1)(d) to 
subrogate themselves to the rights of the depositors. 
Green sheet opinion, page 6 (emphasis added). The emphasized 
dictum is unnecessary to the Court's result, unsupported by 
authority, and highly prejudicial to Plaintiffs/Appellants Richard 
S. Prows, Robert W. Wood, and Foothill Federated Corporation. 
1 
A. This Dictum is Unnecessary to the Court's 
Decision 
In the paragraph preceding the one quoted, the Court holds 
that Plaintiff's Section 7-8a-8 claim "should be made directly 
against the State." Plaintiffs did not claim directly against the 
State, but indirectly through ILGC. 
The Court's opinion continues in the paragraph at issue, "even 
if it was made directly against the State, . . . " The following 
language, including the dictum that Plaintiffs are not deposit 
insurers, thus addresses a purely hypothetical issue. It is 
advisory and superfluous. It is unnecessary to the reasoning 
relied upon by the Court in affirming Judge Young below. 
B. The Dictum is Unsupported by Authority; 
Relevant Authority Suggests that Plaintiffs 
Have a Meritorious Claim 
The dictum that Plaintiffs cannot make a claim as "other 
deposit insurers" is unsupported by any authority or legal reason-
ing in the opinion. Relevant authority suggests that Plaintiffs 
have a meritorious claim. 
Section 7-2-15(1)(d) states in pertinent part: 
Any federal deposit insurance agency or other deposit 
insurer is subrogated to all rights of the depositors to 
the extent of all payments made for the benefit of the 
depositors. 
Plaintiffs have a strong claim based on this section. The basis 
for their claim is that, in order to facilitate the sale of assets 
of Foothill Financial to Zions First National Bank and the assump-
tion of Foothill's liabilities by Zions, Plaintiffs guaranteed 
Zions against loss by reason of its purchase of Foothill's assets. 
2 
Guaranteeing the assets that an insured bank purchases from 
a failing bank as it assumes the latter!s deposits is a classic 
method of insuring deposits; in fact, is among the statutory 
functions the FDIC itself is expressly authorized by federal law 
to perform: 
(2)(A) In order to facilitate . . . the sale of assets 
of such insured bank and the assumption of such insured 
bank's liabilities by an insured institution . . . the 
[Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation is authorized, 
in its sole discretion and upon such terms and conditions 
as the Board of Director may prescribe— 
(iii) to guarantee such insured institution or the 
company which controls or will acquire control of 
such insured institution against loss by reason of 
such insured institution's merging or consolidating 
with or assuming the liabilities and purchasing the 
assets of such insured bank or by reason of such 
company acquiring control of such insured bank; 
12 U.S.C. §1823(c)(2)(A)(iii). This is what Plaintiffs did. 
Moreover, the act of Plaintiffs in incurring an obligation of 
potentially $4.9 million constitutes "payments made" as that term 
is used in Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-15(1) (d) . The term "payments," as 
defined in a 1989 amendment, 
includes arrangements by a federal deposit insurance 
agency for the assumption or payment of the deposit 
liabilities by another institution whose deposits are 
insured by a federal deposit insurance agency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-15(1)(d)(1990 Supp., as amended effective May 
1, 1989). This is precisely the role played by Plaintiffs in the 
Zions transaction. If the term "payments" includes this arrange-
ment when made by a federal deposit insurance agency, surely it 
must also include the identical act performed by private parties 
3 
such as Plaintiffs. See Estate of Corwin, 742 P.2d 528 (N.M.App. 
1987); 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.07 
(Sands 4th ed. 1984)(defining "includes"). 
Furthermore, since this amendment to section 7-2-15(1)(d) 
merely clarified or amplified how the law should have been under-
stood prior to amendment, it is entitled to retroactive applica-
tion. Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979); Okland Construc-
tion Co. v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 208 (Utah 1974). 
Nor is Plaintiffs1 claim as deposit insurers negated by their 
alleged "controlling person" status. Claims of "controlling 
persons" are not barred by statute, merely accorded low priority. 
Claims of depositors who are controlling persons are relegated to 
seventh priority; other claims of controlling persons are eighth. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 7-2-15(1)(g) & (h) . This statutory priority 
scheme does not bar Plaintiffs1 claim for two reasons. 
First, this section is part of a statutory scheme which 
created a procedural framework for the orderly liquidation of 
financial institutions. In this case, it was the ILGC itself which 
was being liquidated; Foothill Financial never was. Therefore, the 
"control" referred to in this section is control of the ILGC. 
There is no evidence before the Court that Plaintiffs were con-
trolling persons with respect to the ILGC. 
Second, even if Plaintiffs were considered to be controlling 
persons as to the ILGC, and therefore file assert seventh- and 
eighth-priority claims, that fact would not foreclose their 
claiming at a higher priority—in this case, as deposit insurers-
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-if they also meet the statutory qualifications for claiming at 
that level. That is, there is no rule that requires who qualifies 
at two different priority levels to claim under the lower priority. 
Plaintiffs believe these arguments are compelling. But even 
if the Court does not accept them, they at minimum demonstrate that 
there are significant legal and factual issues inherent in a 
determination of whether Plaintiffs were deposit insurers in this 
instance. Plaintiffs believe the Court should not dispose of these 
complex issues on the truncated record before it, especially when 
doing so is unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. 
C. The Dictum Is Prejudicial to Plaintiffs1 
Pending Claim in the ILGC Liquidation Proceed-
ing 
The ILGC is currently the subject of a liquidation proceeding 
in Third District Court. On October 7, 1988, Plaintiffs filed a 
claim in that liquidation proceeding. By letter dated April 14, 
1989, the Commissioner gave formal notice to Plaintiffs pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-6(4) (b) of the disallowance of their claim. 
By letter dated April 27, 1989, Plaintiffs formally objected to the 
disallowance of their claim pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-6(9). 
To date the Commissioner has not performed his statutory duty to 
present Plaintiffs1 objection to the Court for hearing and deter-
mination. 
Counsel for Plaintiff and counsel for the Commissioner have 
been negotiating a set of stipulated facts and a framework of 
procedural guidelines for the submission of Plaintiffs1 claim to 
the Third District Court as required by Utah Code Ann. § 7-2-6(9) . 
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A central issue to be presented to the Third District Court is 
whether Plaintiffs qualify as deposit insurers under Section 7-2-
15(1)(d). 
The dictum in the Court's opinion on this appeal will likely 
have the effect of foreclosing Plaintiffs' opportunity to litigate 
the issue of their claim as deposit insurers in the Third District 
Court. In fact, after the issuance of the Court's opinion, 
Plaintiffs' counsel was contacted by counsel for the Commission, 
who inquired whether Plaintiffs would concede the denial of their 
claim in the ILGC proceeding in view of the Court's opinion on this 
appeal. 
Plaintiffs' claim is substantial. Although the amount is 
disputed, it may total several hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
Plaintiffs submit that the proper method of resolving their claim 
is through litigation in the trial court rather than by a gratui-
tous dictum in a case appealed on the subject of governmental 
immunity. 
CONCLUSION AND CERTIFICATION 
In sum, the sentence to which Plaintiffs object would, if not 
deleted from the Court's opinion, have the effect of depriving 
Plaintiffs of their day in court to press a meritorious claim. 
There is no attendant benefit to be gained by its inclusion in the 
Court's opinion, inasmuch as it is unnecessary to the result in the 
case and therefore advisory in any event. Justice therefore 
requires that it be deleted in the final version of the Court's 
opinion. 
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Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants hereby certifies that this 
Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for the 
purpose of delay. 
DATED: July |~^f 1991. '£ 
: i c Voi 
)LE & VOROS 
iorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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